From a State-Centered Approach to Transnational Openness: Adapting the Hague Convention with Contemporary Human Rights Standards as Codified in the Convention of the Rights of the Child by Scott, Allison M
Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 7
Summer 2004
From a State-Centered Approach to Transnational
Openness: Adapting the Hague Convention with
Contemporary Human Rights Standards as
Codified in the Convention of the Rights of the
Child
Allison M. Scott
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls
Part of the Family Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law
Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott, Allison M. (2004) "From a State-Centered Approach to Transnational Openness: Adapting the Hague Convention with
Contemporary Human Rights Standards as Codified in the Convention of the Rights of the Child," Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies: Vol. 11: Iss. 2, Article 7.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol11/iss2/7
From a State-Centered Approach to Transnational
Openness: Adapting the Hague Convention with
Contemporary Human Rights Standards as Codified
in the Convention on the Rights of the Child
ALLISON M. SCOTT*
INTRODUCTION
Parental kidnapping is an increasing problem throughout the world and the
social consequences of globalization have made international child abductions
more frequent. In the United States alone, the Department of Justice states that
354,100 children are reported to have been abducted by a family member in a
single year.' Estimates indicate that one in five parental kidnappings involves a
child being taken across international borders.' The United Kingdom states that
in the last three years there has been a "58 percent increase in the number of in-
ternational parental child abductions."3 In 2000, the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children, which handles all U.S. international child abduction
cases, reported 1,697 international abductions, up 66.7 percent over 1999.
4
The increase of international child abductions has been attributed to the in-
creasing access of international travel and rising divorce rates.' International ab-
*J.D. Candidate, 2004, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S. Psychology,
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ment, and support.
1. See NIGEL LOWE, NATIONAL CTR. FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, INTERNATIONAL
FORUM ON PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION: HAGUE CONVENTION ACTION AGENDA (1999) (citing D.
FINKELHOR ET AL., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET ON MISSING CHILDREN:
NATIONAL INCIDENCES STUDIES OF MISSING, ABDUCTED, RUNAWAY, AND THROWNAWAY CHILDREN I
(1990)).
2. See Rebecaa Hegar, Parental Kidnapping Across International Borders, 34 INT'L Soc. WORK 353
(1991).
3. See LowE, supra note 1, at 2.
4. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT.
5. See Marcia M. Reisman, Comment, Where to Decide the "Best Interests" of Elian Gonzales:
The Law ofAbduction and International Custody Disputes, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 323,324
(2000).
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ductions are more traumatic for both the child and the parent than domestic
abductions.6 This is because "sheer distance, language barriers, and differences
in cultural, legal, and economic systems intensify the trauma felt by the ag-
grieved parent as well as the child."7 In addition, the child's separation and com-
plete isolation from his or her former life greatly increases the trauma he or she
will endure.8 Regardless of the cause of the increase in child abductions across
international borders, something needs to be done to stop this problem.
A. The State-Centered Approach of the Hague Convention
In order to protect children from international abductions, the Hague Con-
vention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction was established
in 1980.' The Hague Convention has been ratified by numerous countries."l
However, the Hague Convention is not working uniformly and it has numerous
6. See Antoinette Passanante, Note, International Parental Kidnapping: The Call for an Increased
Federal Response, 34 COLUM. J. TRANS NAT'L L. 677, 678 (1996).
7. Id. at 678-79.
8. See Susan Kreston, Prosecuting International Parental Kidnapping, 15 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 533, 534 (2001).
9. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction, Nov. 24, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980) [hereinafter Hague Con-
vention]. The Hague Convention was the final act of the Fourteenth Session of the Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law. Delegates from the following nations were present:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Arab Republic
of Egypt, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Yugoslavia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Surinam, Sweden, Switz-
erland, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of
America, and Venezuela; also, representatives from the Governments of Brazil, the Holy See,
Hungary, Monaco, Morocco, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Uruguay participated
by invitation or as Observer. Id.
10. LowE, supra note 1, at 4. The following countries are Contracting States under The Hague
Convention: Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China (Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region only), Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji,
Finland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hon-
duras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova,
Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of Amer-
ica, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. See id. at 21.
234
ADAPTING THE HAGUE CONVENTION
weaknesses that allow many cases to go unresolved." Problems with the Hague
Convention include noncompliance issues and lack of enforceability; procedural
slowness; excessive recourse to exceptions; lack of legal aid for victim families;
and lack of applicability in a large number of countries that are not yet parties to
the Convention. 2 The Hague Convention primarily addresses matters of juris-
diction and "does little or nothing to promote the rights of children."'3 This
Convention is very state-centered 4 because it allows the judicial system of each
participating country to exercise great discretion when interpreting the lan-
guage of the Convention. 5 The use of a state-centered approach by the Hague
Convention provides less protection to children because a human rights univer-
sal, transnational standard is not being enforced.
B. Transnational Openness of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
Conversely, the Convention on the Rights of the Child moves away from a
state-centered approach toward a transnational, 6 global standard. This Con-
vention sets forth specific enumerated rights for children 7 and has been almost
universally adopted. 8 The goal of this Convention is to "emphasize the child's
11. See id. at 7.
12. Id. Parties that are not yet Contracting States include large parts of Africa, China (with the
exception of Hong Kong), India, most Islamic countries, Japan and most other countries in the
Far East, Russia and most of the former Soviet Union. Id. at 4.
13. June Starr, The Global Battlefield: Culture and International Child Custody Disputes at Cen-
tury's End, 15 ARIz. J. INT'L & CoMp. L 791, 832 (1998).
14. See Jost Delbriuck, Prospectsfora "World (Internal) Law?": Legal Developments in a Changing
International System, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL Lac. STUD. 401 (2002) (giving an explanation of how state-
centered international laws are changing due to globalization).
15. See Courtney E. Hoben, The Hague Convention on International Parental Kidnapping: Closing
the Article 13(b) Loophole, 5 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 271, 280-83 (1999).
16. Delbruck, supra note 14, at 421 (defining globalization as "a process of denationalization of
the legal interactions in the international system" including those between private actors).
17. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov.
20, 1989, 28 I.L.M 1448, 1456 [hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child].
18. The Child's Right Convention has been ratified by 192 countries and only two countries
have not ratified, the United States of America and Somalia. See UNICEF, The Convention on the
Rights of Children, at http'//www.unicef.org/crc/crc.htm [hereinafter UNICEF]. The United
States has signaled its intention to ratify by formally signing the Child's Rights Convention and
currently it is the "only industrialized country in the world and one of only two United Nations
member States that have failed to make this legal commitment to children." Somalia is presently
without a recognized government. Id.
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best interests in all actions concerning him or her, and these best interests are
considered in the context of the child's family ties; continuity in upbringing; and
ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic background."19 This Convention over-
rides the domestic laws of each country and aims to preserve traditionalist, so-
cialist structures, while promoting the human rights of children, even against
these domestic laws. Thus, this Convention reaches past the domestic legal or-
der, regardless of citizenship and thereby takes a non-state-centered approach.0
C. Adopting a Transnational Approach
In order to thoroughly protect children, the state-centered approach of the
Hague Convention should be modified to include many of the transnational
standards set forth in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. These two
major conventions, each with a considerable to extraordinary level of acceptance
by the international community of States, overlap in terms of children's rights.
The children's rights provisions of the Hague Convention are not principally in-
compatible with the children's rights provisions of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child; they are simply narrower or provide less protection to children.
Since most State Parties are bound by both conventions, they are under an obli-
gation to comply with both treaties.2 Thus, the Hague Convention needs to be
interpreted more broadly in favor of the human rights protection standards set
forth in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
By interpreting the Hague Convention more broadly using the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, the force of the global human rights movement over-
rides the state-centered approach of the Hague Convention, which gives priority
to the authority of domestic courts in determining the fate of the children in-
volved.22 If the Hague Convention complies with the Convention on the Rights of
19. See Cara L. Finan, Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Potentially Effective Remedy in
Cases of International Child Abduction, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1007, 1019-20 (1994) (citing Child's
Right Convention, arts. 3, 9, 17-18, 20-21,40).
20. See generally Delbruck,supra note 14.
21. Most of the State Parties are bound by both conventions; therefore, if the two treaties are
partially incompatible, then an amendment to the earlier treaty, the Hague Convention, is the
only way to adopt it to the later treaty, the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
22. See generally Brian S. Kenworthy, The Un-Common Law: Emerging Differences Between the
United States and the United Kingdom on the Children's Rights Aspects of the Hague Convention on In-
ternational Child Abduction, 12 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 329, 337-38 (2002) (stating that the
drafters of the Hague Convention wanted to allow all courts some discretion).
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the Child, the Hague Convention will open to transnational scrutiny decisions of
domestic courts. Also, adopting the Convention on the Rights of the Child in ap-
plying the Hague Convention implies the recognition of the status of the children
as subjects of international law, a result that is clearly in line with the general ob-
servation that globalization impacts the structure of the international system by
diversifying the number of legally recognized actors.23 This impact is not only of
doctrinal interest, but has very practical consequences for those affected by inter-
national abductions. Therefore, allowing the Hague Convention to adopt the
transnational, human rights protection standard set forth in the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, will enable the Hague Convention to reach its greatest po-
tential. The Hague Convention will not only serve as a disincentive for individu-
als to commit international child abductions, because of the closer scrutiny
resulting from international control, but it will also become a transnational and
global document that strongly promotes human rights.24
This Note scrutinizes current methods being used to protect children, par-
ticularly taking into account the differences between the state-centered ap-
proach of the Hague Convention and the transnational approach of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Part II examines the premises behind the
Hague Convention, the requirements for its application, the exceptions for its
application, and its overall effectiveness in fighting international child abduc-
tions. Part III describes the purpose and principles of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Part IV will examine the discrepancies between the Hague
Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child and how these dis-
crepancies should be resolved so that the best interest of the child is always and
consistently in the forefront. Part V concludes that the Hague Convention must
adopt the transnational and global principles from the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, thereby allowing the Hague Convention to not only be a remedy
for international child abductions, but also allowing the Hague Convention to
serve as a human rights document.
23. Delbruick, supra note 14, at 406 (describing how "the foundation of international organiza-
tions constituted a change of the structure of the international system" and how this change diver-
sified the type of actors "participating in the transactions in the international system").
24. See Finan,supra note 19, at 1038 (stating that "[tihe world stands to gain a great deal by treat-
ing international child abductions as human rights violations.")
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I. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CHILD ABDUCTION
In the fall of 1980, the international community met at The Hague to ad-
dress the increasing problem of parental child abduction.25 The Hague Conven-
tion's purpose is to prevent international child abductions and to secure the
prompt return of children to their habitual residence.26 The "overarching policy
of the Convention [is] the creation of a system of close cooperation among judi-
cial and administrative authorities of the contracting nations to prevent the in-
ternational removal of children from their habitual residence." 27 This
Convention attempts to employ a novel approach by focusing on methods of fos-
tering collaboration among the central authorities of each country instead of at-
tempting to promote the enforcement and recognition of foreign decisions.28 In
order to achieve the tasks of the Hague Convention, each country who is a sig-
natory, deemed a Contracting State, must set up a "Central Authority."29 The
25. See Hoben, supra note 15, at 273. On October 24, 1980, the Hague Convention was adopted.
Id. at 273-74.
26. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 1. The Hague Convention provides a purely civil rem-
edy as opposed to a criminal remedy. See Passanante, supra note 6, at 690. The drafters chose to ad-
dress civil aspects of abduction mainly because criminal sanctions are generally inefficient in
deterring international child abductions. Id.
27. See Jan Rewers McMillan, Current International and Domestic Issues Affecting Children: Get-
ting Them Back: The Disappointed Reality of Return Orders Under the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International ChildAbduction, 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 99, 101 (1997) (citing Eliza
Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report, Hague Convention on Private International Law, 3 Acts and Docu-
ments of the Fourteenth Session para. 35 (1982)).
28. Finan, supra note 19, at 1013 (citing Lawrence N. Stotter, History to the Hague Convention, in
AM. BAR ASS'N, INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS: A GUIDE TO APPLYING THE 1988 HAGUE CON-
VENTION, WITH FORMS 8 (Gloria F. DeHart ed., 1989)). Under this Convention, courts are not al-
lowed to investigate the merits of the case. LOWE, supra note 1, at 4. Thus, courts do not and should
not decide which parent should look after the child. Id. This responsibility is for the Court of the
habitual state in which the child is a resident. Id. Article 16 supports this contention by stating:
After receiving notice of a wrongful removal or retention of a child .. . the judicial
or administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been
removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of
custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this
Convention.
Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 16, at 1503.
29. Hague Convention, supra note 9, arts. 6 & 7, at 1501-02. Under Article 6, each contract state
is required to "designate a Central Authority to discharge the duties which are imposed by the
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parent-abductor is required to return the child to his or her habitual residence so
that the issues disputed between the parents can be resolved.3 °
A. Requirements for the Application of the Hague Convention
In order for the Hague Convention to apply, the child must be younger than
the age of sixteen, a habitual resident in one of the Contracting States, and the
child must have been wrongfully removed to or retained in another Contracting
State.3 Under this Convention, "wrongful" is defined as a removal or retention
that breaches a right of custody under the laws of the state where the child was a
habitual resident immediately before the removal.32 Wrongful removal occurs
when a child is taken to an international frontier without permission of a parent
or guardian who has custody rights. Wrongful retention takes place when a
child is kept in a country longer than the agreed-upon period.33 Therefore, if the
Hague Convention is going to apply, the child must be a habitual resident of a
Contracting State and must have been wrongfully taken to a Contracting State.
34
Furthermore, Article 35 states that the Convention will only apply between
Convention upon such authorities." Id. at 1501. Under Article 7, the Central Authorities are to
"co-operate with each other and promote co-operation amongst the competent authorities in their
respective states to secure the prompt return of children" and in particular they are required to
take appropriate measures in discovering the child's whereabouts, securing the child's safe return,
and providing legal aid when required. Id. at 1502.
30. LowE, supra note 1, at 4.
31. Hague Convention, supra note 9, arts. 3 & 4, at 1501. The Hague Convention states that it
ceases "to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years." Id. at 1501. Regardless of a child's sta-
tus, the Convention will cease to apply when the child obtains the age of 16. See also Finan, supra
note 19, at 1014.
32. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 3, at 1501. Article 3 states:
[T]he removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where - a. it
is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other
body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habit-
ually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and b. at the time of re-
moval or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or
would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
Habitual residence "refers to the place where the child has his or her 'home'." Lowe, supra note 1,
at 11.
33. LowE, supra note 1, at 3.
34. Finan, supra note 19, at 1014.
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Contracting States when wrongful removals or retentions occurred after the
Hague Convention has been entered into force in those States.35
A custody order does not have to be in effect for a parent to seek the return of
an abducted child under the Hague Convention.36 Under Article 17, a Contract-
ing State cannot base a decision not to return a child solely on a court order grant-
ing the wrongdoer custody.3 7 This ensures that the Hague Convention will "take
precedence over decrees in favor of abductors before the court to which the abduc-
tor applies has notice of the wrongful removal or retention."38 Based on this re-
quirement, the abductor is not able to avoid the requirements of the Convention
by enforcing a custody order that was in place in another country or by attempting
to acquire a custody order for the abducted child in the new country.39 The child
plays a passive role in this situation. As such, the person who exercised custody
rights before the abduction, or the person who would have exercised custody
rights but for the abduction, must invoke the Hague Convention.
40
If these requirements are met and the request for an order requiring the re-
turn of the child is brought quickly,4' the court of the Contracting State to which
the child was taken must order a return "forthwith," unless the case falls under
one of the Hague Convention exceptions.
42
35. Id. at 1014-15. See also Hague Convention,supra note 9, at 1504.
36. Finan, supra note 19, at 1015.
37. Id. at 1015. Article 17 states:
The sole fact that a decision relating to custody has been given in or is entitled to rec-
ognition in the requested State shall not be a ground for refusing to return a child
under this Convention, but the judicial or administrative authorities of the re-
quested State may take account of the reasons for that decision in applying this Con-
vention.
Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 1503.
38. Finan, supra note 19, at 1015.
39. Id. at 1015.
40. Id. at 1014-15.
41. Article 12 states:
Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained ... and, at the date of the
commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of
the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed
from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall
order the return of the child forthwith.
Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 1502.
42. See LowE, supra note 1, at 3.
240
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B. Exceptions to the Requirement to Return a Child Under the Hague Convention
There are six exceptions to the Hague Convention, anyone of which if met,
allow a Contracting State the right to refuse to order the return of a child.43 The
exceptions apply when the custodial parent consented or acquiesced to the re-
moval or retention; the custodial parent failed to exercise his/her custodial rights;
the child is settled into his/her new environment; the return is not permitted by the
requested nation's fundamental principles regarding human rights and funda-
mental freedoms; the return poses a "grave risk" of exposing the child to physical
or psychological harm or an intolerable situation; or when the child objects to re-
turning and is old enough and mature enough to make such objection.44
These exceptions were not intended to be easily met; yet, even when a party
meets the standards, the court still has the authority to order a child to be returned.45
Under Article 18, the judicial or administrative authority always has the right to
order the return of a child at any time.46 Thus, the general rule is that a child who
was wrongfully removed should be returned to his or her habitual residence.47
1. Custodial Parent Exceptions
Some of the exceptions are applicable because they negate a specific require-
ment of the Act, such as the wrongful removal of the child. This happens when
the custodial parent acquiesces or consents to the removal or retention.48 Thus,
without the requirement of a wrongful removal, the "applicability of the Hague
Convention is directly at issue, and in such circumstances, courts are not man-
dated by the Article 12 duty to order the return of the child."49 Also, the custodial
parent must establish that he or she had custodial rights and that he or she was
also exercising those custodial rights.5" Again, this is linked to the issue of
43. See Hague Convention, supra note 9, arts. 3b, 12, 13,20, at 1501-03.
44. Kenworthy, supra note 22, at 334-35; Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 3b, 12, 13, 20, at
1501-03.
45. LowE, supra note 1, at 4 .
46. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 1503.
47. See LowE, supra note 1, at 4.
48. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 13a, at 1502.
49. Kenworthy, supra note 22, at 335.
50. Id. Article 3b states that removal is wrongful if custodial "rights were actually exercised,
either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention." Hague
Convention, supra note 9, at 1501.
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wrongful removal and the Convention presumes that a person who has custo-
dial rights is actively exercising them.5' This exception places the burden on the
abductor to prove that the parent seeking the return of the child was not exercis-
ing his or her custodial rights.52 Therefore, little is required in order for the ap-
plicant to establish that he or she was exercising custody rights before the
abduction.
53
2. Settled Into New Environment
The exception regarding a child already being settled in his or her new en-
vironment can be found under Article 12." This exception allows a Contracting
State to refuse to order the return of a child.55 The Hague Convention is con-
cerned with the issue of a child who becomes familiar with his or her new sur-
roundings and is then uprooted again and ordered to be returned.56 By allowing
this exception, the Hague Convention is attempting to enforce one of the goals of
the Convention, which is the prompt return of the child to his or her habitual
residence. 57 The more time the return takes, the more settled the child will be
into his or her new environment; therefore, the less likely the goals of the Con-
vention are being preserved.58
3. Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom
Another exception, set forth in Article 20 of the Hague Convention, has
rarely been used.59 This exception permits a Contracting State to refuse to return
51. Kenworthy, supra note 22, at 336.
52. Id.
53. Id. Article 8(c) explains that the applicant must state "the grounds on which the applicant's
claim for return of the child is based." Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 1502. If the applicant
fulfills this informal requirement it usually proves to be enough to indicate proper exercise of cus-
todial rights. See Lynda R. Herring, Comment, Taking Away the Pawns: International Parental Ab-
duction & the Hague Convention, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 137,160-61 (1994).
54. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 1502. Article 12 states "the judicial or administrative
authority.., shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now
settled in its new environment."
55. Id.
56. Kenworthy, supra note 22, at 336.
57. LowE, supra note 1, at 3.
58. Kenworthy, supra note 22, at 336.
59. See Herring, supra note 53, at 171 (citation omitted) (stating that as of 1994, there had not
been a single case defining the Article 20 exception).
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child if the return "would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the
requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms."' Article 20 addresses the drafters' concern with the forum State's
public policy, because this Article allows the forum State to apply its particular
policies instead of referring "to international agreements dealing with human
rights and fundamental freedoms."'" Courts, however, are to use judicial re-
straint when applying this exception so as not to undermine the purpose of the
62Hague Convention. This exception is to be invoked only when the return
would "utterly shock the conscience of the Court or offend all notions of due
process."63 Due to the narrow interpretation of this standard, courts have re-
jected most arguments claiming an Article 20 violation. 64
4. Grave Risk of Harm
Conversely, the grave risk of harm exception is the defense most commonly
used by courts. 65 This exception allows the court to refuse to return the child if the
return poses a "grave risk" of exposing the child to "physical or psychological
harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation."66 The grave risk ex-
ception is supposed to be construed narrowly, as are all of the exceptions, and was
"intended to be raised when it was established that the child itself (not the abduct-
ing parent) would be placed in an intolerable situation if returned to his/her nation
of habitual residence." 67 In order for an "intolerable situation" to exist, it must be
determined that the risk involves more than trivial complaints and, further, that
the situation must be one that is extreme and compelling in nature.68 One cannot
60. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 1503.
61. Lara Cardin, Comment, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Ab-
duction as Applied to Non-Signatory Nations: Getting to Square One, 20 Hous. J. INT'L L. 141, 153
(1997) (citation omitted).
62. Id. (citation omitted).
63. Id. (quoting McCall v. McCall, [1995] F.L.C. 92-551).
64. Id. (citations omitted). See also Lisa Nakdai, It's 10 PM., Do You Know Where Your Children
Are?: The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 40 FAM. CT. REV.
251, 255 (2002) (citation omitted) (stating that Finland and the United Kingdom did not include
Article 20 in their national legislation).
65. Kenworthy, supra note 22, at 337 (citation omitted).
66. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art 13(b), at 1502.
67. Kenworthy, supra note 22, at 337.
68. Id. at 338.
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simply claim that the child would be better off staying in the country to which she
was taken. Courts usually require a showing that there is a high degree of risk that
returning the child will lead to psychological or physical harm.69
In allowing this exception, the drafters of the Convention wanted to allow
the courts some discretion to recognize the realities of returning a child.7" This
exception allows the courts to look at the merits of the case, even though this
practice is in direct conflict with the goals of the Convention.7 Allowing the
haven state the opportunity to examine the merits of each case has produced un-
certainty in the use and interpretation of the grave risk of harm exception.72
Some argue that this exception is only utilized in situations where returning the
child "places him/her in danger due to some existent condition, such as war or a
recent natural disaster."73 However, the courts of the various Contracting States
have defined grave risk of harm in strikingly different ways and, in so doing,
created significant problems.74
Courts construing the grave risk of harm exception have applied it in various
ways.7" For example, a French court found an "intolerable situation" when asked
to return a child to Los Angeles.76 The court stated that the polluted environment
of Los Angeles posed a danger to the child's health.77 An Ireland court found an
"intolerable situation" where the father was irresponsible with money and caused
the family eviction.7" American courts, however, are less likely to find an "intoler-
able situation" and are therefore, less likely to use the grave risk of harm excep-
tion.79 In Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, the court did not find an "intolerable
situation" where the abducting mother was abused by the husband and father-in-
law."0 Courts in the United States have stated that "although children must be
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Hoben,supra note 15, at 276. By examining the merits of the case, the "[Convention]'s objec-
tive of ensuring that the rights of custody under the law of one Contracting State are respected in
the other Contracting state" is defeated. Id.
72. See id.
73. Kenworthy, supra note 22, at 339 (citing Linda R. Herring, Taking Away the Pawns: Interna-
tional ParentalAbduction & the Hague Convention, 20 N.C. J INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 137, 148 (1994)).




78. Id. (citing PF v. MF, [1992] 2 Ir. S.C. 390).
79. See id.
80. Id. at 281-82 (citing Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995)).
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safeguarded from a 'grave risk' of harm, other options for the children's protec-
tion must be considered beyond allowing the children to stay with the abducting
parent."'" Clearly, this narrow interpretation taken by American courts is consis-
tent with the intent of the Convention.82 This wide disparity of interpretation is
problematic in that it "undermines the effectiveness of the Convention and pre-
vents the Convention from successfully combating the problem of international
parental kidnapping."83 By allowing the courts to exercise great discretion in in-
terpreting the Convention, the Convention is utilizing a state-centered approach.
In order for the goals of the Convention to be effective, it is necessary to move
away from a state-centered approach and toward a transnational approach by
adopting a universal interpretation of this exception.
84
5. Child's Objection
The last exception to the application of the Hague Convention, which has
also been interpreted in various ways by the courts in different countries, applies
when the child objects to being returned.85 When the child is old enough and
mature enough to contest being returned, a court may refuse to order the return
of the child.86 This exception was provided by the drafters because they knew sit-
uations would arise where it should be found that the Convention is inapplicable
to a particular child otherwise subject to it.87 Thus, the drafters reluctantly de-
81. Id. at 282 (citing Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001)). The mother in this case
wanted to invoke the "grave risk" of harm exception in order to prevent the return of the child to
the abusive father in France. Id. The Court stated that under the 13(b) exception, the Court must
take into account "any ameliorative measures that can reduce the risk to the children, while still
allowing the custody determination to take place in the home State." Id.
82. Id. at 283.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 283. See also LowE,supra note 1, at 12. The goals of the Convention are to return the
child to their habitual residence promptly, thus, recommending that 13(b) be applied narrowly
and to utilize this exception only when there is no other alternative. Id. Also, "where a return
order is made despite domestic violence, abuse, and other severe family law matters in the child's
habitual place of residence, the Central Authorities should assist in ensuring that these matters are
properly forwarded to the appropriate child welfare agencies and the court." Id. at 13.
85. Nakdai,supra note 64, at 255.
86. Kenworthy, supra note 22, at 339. See Hague Convention,supra note 9, at 1502 (stating "[t]he
judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that
the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is
appropriate to take account of its views.").
87. Kenworthy, supra note 22, at 340.
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cided to allow the courts some discretion by permitting them to consider the
views of the child." In applying this exception, a court must consider both
whether or not the child has objected and whether the child is mature enough or
old enough to allow his/her objection to be considered.89 The drafters did not
provide a specific age or objective assessment criteria for determining maturity,
thus, the application of this exception has been arbitrary. ° There have been cases
stating that "nine, ten, and twelve year-olds are not of sufficient age in order to
merit consideration of their views.. .while conversely, there have been cases
holding that eleven-, twelve-, and thirteen-year-old children are of sufficient
age." 9' The concern with this exception, similar to the grave risk of harm excep-
tion, is the potential for abuse of judicial discretion permitted by the Conven-
tion's state-centered approach. 92
Because of inconsistent judicial interpretations, the Hague Convention ex-
ceptions create effectiveness problems in terms of serving the purpose of the
Convention-the prompt return of the child to the child's habitual residence.93
Thus, in order to make the Hague Convention more effective, it is necessary to
consider aspects of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which takes a
transnational and global approach to the problem of child abduction.
II. THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
The Convention on the Rights of Children is the most universally accepted
human rights instrument in history.94 In 1993, the World Conference on Human
Rights set the end of 1995 as a target for the universal ratification of the Conven-




91. Id. at 341 (citing Sheikh v. Cahill, 546 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding that a nine
year-old fails to be of sufficient age). But cf Nakdai,supra note 64, at 255 (stating "a nine-year-old
girl was found mature enough to make an objection when the court found that her mental age
was that of a twelve- year-old" and that an eleven year-old-boy was able to stay in Scotland upon
his desire). LowE,supra note 1, at 12 (stating that one refusal of return was based on the objections
of a four-year-old).
92. Kenworthy, supra note 22, at 341.
93. LowE, supra note 1, at 3.
94. UNICEF, supra note 18.
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the Convention, making it the most widely and rapidly ratified human rights
treaty in history. As of mid-2000, only two States had not yet ratified.95 The Con-
vention incorporates the full range of human rights for children: civil, political,
social, economic, and cultural." This Convention "empowers the child to de-
velop physically, morally, psychologically, spiritually and socially, to his or her
fullest potential."97 The drafters of this universally accepted human rights in-
strument were selected from every region of the world in an effort "to ensure
that all cultures, major religions and legal systems were represented in the draft-
ing process."
98
The Convention on the Rights of the Child states that children are defined
as "all human beings under the age of 18, unless the relevant national laws rec-
ognize an earlier age of majority."' If a country is going to substitute an earlier
age, the Convention makes it clear that the country must base this age substitu-
tion on the Convention's guiding principles."0 The Convention's four guiding
principles 0 1 are: non-discrimination, 2 best interest of the child," 3 survival and
development,' ° and participation. 5 Age is seen as an important factor when at-
tempting to uphold the principles of the Convention.
95. Id. at http'//www.unicef.org/crc/faq/htm. The two states that have yet to ratify are the
United States and Somalia. Currently Somalia is unable to proceed to ratification because it has no
recognized government. The United States has signed the Convention, signaling its "intention to
ratify-but has yet to do so." Id.
96. Id.
97. Rebeca Rios-Kohn, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Progress and Challenges, 5 GEo.
J. FIGHTING POVERTY 139, 142 (1998).
98. Id. (stating that as a result of using diverse drafters the Convention "represents minimum
legal standards and ethical standards agreed to and respected by all sectors of the international
community").
99. UNICEF, supra note 18; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17. Article I
states "[flor the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the
age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier."
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 1459.
100. UNICEF, supra note 18.
101. Id.
102. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 1459.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1460.
105. Id. at 1461.
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A. Non-Discrimination
The non-discrimination principle of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child "obligates States to respect and ensure the rights of each child within their
jurisdictions, with no discrimination.""0 6 Article 2 of the Convention was
drafted in order to create the broadest possible protection for children." 7 The
States each carry the burden of taking necessary measures to provide the rights
of the Convention to all children within each State's jurisdiction.' 8 Therefore,
all States "must not only refrain from any action that would have a discrimina-
tory effect on some child, but also actively protect children from all forms of
discrimination. '"109 This fundamental non-discrimination principle of the Con-
vention implies that a child does not have to rely on "his or her legal status in
order to enjoy the rights embodied in the Convention.""0.. This depicts how the
Convention reaches past domestic legal orders, regardless of citizenship, and
takes a non-state-centered, transnational approach.
106. Rios-Kohn, supra note 97, at 145. Article 2 of the Convention states:
1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Conven-
tion to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irre-
spective of the childs or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, prop-
erty, disability, birth or other status.
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is pro-
tected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status,
activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or
family members.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 1459.
107. Rios-Kohn,supra note 97, at 145.
108. Id. at 145, 146.
109. Id. at 146.
110. Id. (stating that "the rights therein may be enjoyed by refugee children, children of illegal
immigrants, and children who are considered stateless").
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B. Best Interest of the Child
The second fundamental principle of the Convention, the best interest of
the child, is discussed in Article 3."' For every situation that effects the child, all
"possible solutions must be considered and due weight given to the child's best
interests."', 2 This approach must be used in all situations, "from direct interven-
tions by States in their jurisdictions to theprivate context of family life, where
States may intervene indirectly-through local authorities, for example-to en-
sure and protect children's rights."' 3 Therefore, this principle should be applied
when administrative authorities dictate budgets and policies, when private insti-
tutions take action regarding children, and when parents make decisions about
raising their children."4 Broad application of the best interest of the child stan-
dard should create sensitivity to the rights and needs of children."' Yet, "this
does not guarantee that a child's interest will always prevail; it only guarantees
that the child's interest will be fully considered and given due weight in relation
to competing interests.""' 6 This approach promotes "the recognition of the child
as possessor of certain rights which entitles him/her to consideration of any in-
terests that may be affected."".7
111. Id. at 145. Article 3 states:
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is neces-
sary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her
parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and,
to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible
for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established
by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number
and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 1459.
112. UNICEF, supra note 18, at http://www.unicef.org/crc/bg005.htm.
113. Id.
114. Rios-Kohn,supra note 97, at 144; see also generally UNICEFsupra note 18.
115. Rios-Kohn,supra note 97, at 144.
116. Id.
117. Kenworthy, supra note 22, at 345.
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C. Survival and Development
The survival and development principle of the Convention also discusses
the rights of the child." 8 This principle, found in Article 3 of the Convention,
addresses the child's right to life, survival, and development." 9 Thus, "States
Parties must recognize this right as inherent to every child and commit to acting
in a way that will ensure and respect this right."'20 In order to recognize these
rights, States have to adopt measures which safeguard life and must not take any
actions that "intentionally take life away."'' Examples of these measures include
actions to "increase life expectancy and to lower infant and child mortality, as
well as prohibitions on the death penalty; extralegal, arbitrary or summary exe-
cutions; and situations of enforced disappearance." '22 This principle stands for
the promotion of human dignity, in that States "should fully ensure the right to
an adequate standard of living, including the right to housing, nutrition and the
highest attainable standards of health.' ' 23 These rights are to be ensured "'to the
maximum extent possible' - they must do their utmost to give the highest prior-
ity to actions undertaken in this regard.' 24
The survival and development principle is not limited to a physical perspec-
tive.'25 It also "emphasizes the need to ensure full and harmonious development
of the child, including at the spiritual, moral and social levels, where education
will play a key role....26 In order to promote this principle, States must assume
deeper obligations of "ensuring that children will be able to develop talents and
abilities to their fullest potential, that children will be prepared for a responsible
life in a free society, and that they will feel solidarity with the world they live
in."'127 By promoting such ends as the development of talents, education, and liv-
118. See UNICEF, supra note 18.
119. See id. Article 6 states: "1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to
life. 2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of
the child." Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 1460.
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ing in a free society, the Convention attempts to preserve traditionalist structures
that are aimed at promoting the human rights of the child regardless of the do-
mestic law at issue. Again, this Convention is utilizing a transnational and global
approach, whereas the Hague Convention uses a state-centered approach.
D. Participation
Participation, the last guiding principle of the Convention, reaffirms that
children are individuals "who have the right to express their views in all matters
affecting them and requires that those views be heard and given due weight in
accordance with the child's age and maturity."'28 This principle recognizes that
children have the potential to enrich the decision-making process.'29 In each and
every matter concerning a child, the child's right to participate must be consid-
ered. 3 ' This right "stands on its own; it requires a clear commitment and effec-
tive actions to become a living reality and therefore is much more than a simple
strategy.'' I.. The right to participate is "an additional dimension to the univer-
sally recognized freedom of expression, implying the right of the child to be
heard and to have his or her views or opinions taken into account." ' 2
The four guiding principles, identified as the "soul of the treaty," are essen-
tial in order to understand the spirit of the Convention. 3 This Convention
brought together the rights of children in one instrument and spelled out the
rights to be granted to children everywhere, "regardless of where born or to
128. Id. at http://www.unicef.org/crc/bg007.htm. Article 12 states:
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity
of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be
heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either di-
rectly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent
with the procedural rules of national law.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 1461.




133. Rios-Kohn, supra note 97, at 143.
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whom, regardless of sex, religion, or social origin."'34 The principles and proce-
dures of this Convention differ in many ways from those of the Hague Conven-
tion. The differences between the two Conventions derive from the historical,
state-centered approach of the Hague Convention, while the Convention on the
Rights of the Child employs a transnational, global approach. These differences
must be examined in order to determine how to improve the Hague Convention
and in effect, better protect children from international abductions.
III. RESOLVING THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE HAGUE CONVENTION
AND THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD IN ORDER TO
BETTER PROTECT THE INTEREST OF THE CHILD
The Hague Convention should adopt several principles and standards set
forth in the Convention on the Rights of the Child in order to become more ef-
fective in preventing and discouraging international child abductions. The prin-
ciples that need to be adopted from the Convention on the Rights of the Child
include the age requirement, the concept of the best interest of the child, in rela-
tion to the grave risk of harm exception under the Hague Convention, and the
right of participation for the child, in relation to the child objecting exception. If
these principles are taken from the Convention on the Rights of the Child and
are adopted and implemented by the Hague Convention, the effectiveness of the
Hague Convention would greatly increase. By adopting these principles, the
Hague Convention would not only be more effective in preventing international
child abductions, but it would also be promoting and protecting the rights of
children. Adopting these principles would allow the Hague Convention to reach
its greatest potential, as both a human rights document and an effective means of
deterring international child abductions.
A. Age
The first principle which the Hague Convention should adopt from the
Convention on the Rights of the Child is the maximum age at which the Con-
vention applies. The Hague Convention only applies when the child is under the
age of sixteen. 3 ' Yet, the Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child
134. UNICEF, supra note 18, at http://unicef.org/crc/convention.htm.
135. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 1501.
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as anyone under the age of eighteen.'36 Instead of using sixteen years as the age
when the Hague Convention is no longer applicable, the Hague Convention
should employ the age of eighteen years instead. Indeed, the sixteen year-old age
provision was not greatly disputed under the Hague Convention. 137 This age
was selected "as the crucial age for purposes of the Hague Convention, largely
because it was thought that a person over the age of sixteen possessed a strong
enough will to mount a successful challenge to the will of his or her parents or
any nation's administrative authorities. ' 38
Yet, the prevailing view in most countries is that eighteen is the age of ma-
turity. In the United States, the age of eighteen "marks the age of maturity,"'139
the age when an individual is able to vote and enlist in the army. It has been de-
termined by society that when one is "under age 18, one's physical, mental, emo-
tional, and social growth is still in the formative stage; not yet fully mature. '"14°
Thus, expanding the age provision would bring the Hague Convention more in
line with societal views. 4' The impact of this change would be more theoretical
than practical and is "unlikely to reduce substantially the number of interna-
tional parental abductions, as children between the ages of 16 and 18 generally
cannot be taken or kept anywhere without at least their implicit consent." '42
However, this change would promote consistency,'43 dissuading a state-centered
approach, while promoting a transnational, global approach. Therefore, the
Hague Convention should apply to children up to the age of eighteen instead of
sixteen.
B. Best Interest of the Child and Grave Risk of Harm
The second provision that should be changed in the Hague Convention re-
lates to the grave risk of harm exception under 13(b).'44 The grave risk of harm
136. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at 1448.
137. See Passanante, supra note 6, at 696.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Susan Kramer, Should Youth Under Age 18Be Tried As Adults in Criminal Court?, available at
http://www.powertoshare.com/forums/social/posts/82.html (last modified Sept. 21, 2002).
141. See Passanante, supra note 6, at 696 (stating that expanding the age provision would bring
the Convention more in line with federal laws in the United States).
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 1502.
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exception is only supposed to be used when "there is a grave risk that his or her
return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise
place the child in an intolerable situation. '145 This exception fails to take into ac-
count the best interest of the child and the "precise language of this exception in-
dicates the narrow scope the drafters intended it to have."' 46 The Legal Analysis
of the Hague Convention stated that the 13(b) exception "was not intended to be
used ... as a vehicle to litigate the child's best interests."'47 Yet, the grave risk of
harm exception should take into account the best interest of the child.'48
The emphasis of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is "promoting
the best interest of the child in every situation that could potentially affect him or
her.'"i4' This notion should be incorporated into the Hague Convention's grave
risk of harm exception in Article 13(b). By taking into account the principle of
the best interest of the child when determining if there is a grave risk of harm in-
volved in returning the child, the negative, state-centered approach of the
Hague Convention can be overcome by the transnational, global standards of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Thus, allowing the strong human
rights aspects of the Convention on the Rights of the Child to enumerate and
protect the rights of children.
C. Participation Rights and Child Objecting
The last amendment which the Hague Convention should adopt in order for
this Convention to better promote the rights of the child relates to the child object-
ing exception. Under Article 13 of the Hague Convention, the child is able to voice
his or her opinion on whether or not he or she wants to be returned." This excep-
145. Sharon Nelson, Turning our Backs on the Children: Implications of Recent Decisions Regarding
the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 677 (2001); Hague
Convention, supra note 9, at 1502.
146. Mark Dorosin, You Must Go Home Again: Friedrich v. Friedrich, The Hague Convention and
The International ChildAbduction Remedies Act, 18 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 743, 751 (1993).
147. Id. at 751 (citing Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, 51 FED. REG. 10, 503-06 (1986)).
148. See Nelson, supra note 145, at 693 (arguing that the grave risk of harm exception should be
expanded so that it includes psychological abuse because "even if the child is not being beaten
[that) does not mean he is not being harmed").
149. Finan, supra note 19, at 1032. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 17, at
1459.
150. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 1501.
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tion "represents a compromise of two significant competing interests-the desire
to expand the scope and application of the Convention versus the situation of chil-
dren under sixteen who have the right to choose their own place of residence."'
' 5
'
However, "the availability of the Child's Objection defense constitutes an essential
feature of the Convention and manifests unique significance to society's most
cherished asset: children."' 2 Thus, this exception should incorporate the right of
participation as provided under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The right to participation is one of the four principles of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child.'53 This right recognizes the importance of allowing the
child "the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceed-
ings affecting the child, either directly or through a representative."'54 By having
the Hague Convention adopt this principle, all children regardless of age or ma-
turity would be allowed the right and opportunity to be heard in proceedings to
determine whether the child should be returned. A strict interpretation of this
exception is necessary in order to preserve the aspirations of the Hague Conven-
tion. It must be reaffirmed, however, "that children are full-fledged persons
who have the right to express their views in all matters affecting them and...
that those views be heard and given due weight in accordance with the child's
age and maturity."'55 Thus, the Hague Convention's objecting child exception
should incorporate the participation rights established by the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.
CONCLUSION
In order to better protect and promote the rights of children, the Hague
Convention's state-centered approach should be tempered by adopting some of
the principles which the Convention on the Rights of the Child created through
the use of a transnational approach. International child abductions must be pre-
vented, discouraged, and remedied. If the Hague Convention adopts these
151. Rania Nanos, The Views ofa Child: Emerging Interpretation and Significance of the Child's Ob-
jection Defense Under the Hague Child Abduction Convention, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 437, 443-44
(1996).
152. Id. at 465.
153. See UNICEF, supra note 18, at http://www.unicef.org/crc/bg007.htm.
154. Convention on the Rights of the Child,supra note 17, at 1501.
155. UNICEF, supra note 18, at http://www.unicef.org/crc/bg007.htm.
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transnational and global principles from the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, it will more effectively remedy international child abductions and serve
as a human rights document. This would then enable the Hague Convention to
reach its greatest potential both as a means of discouraging and remedying inter-
national child abductions and as a human rights document.
